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HOW RONALD FISHER BECAME A MATHEMATICAL STATISTICIAN 
Stephen M. STIGLER1 
RÉSUMÉ – Comment Ronald Fisher devint statisticien 
En hommage à Bernard Bru, cet article rend compte de l’influence décisive qu’a eu Karl Pearson sur 
Ronald Fisher. Fisher ayant soumis un bref article rédigé de façon hâtive et insuffisamment réfléchie, 
Pearson lui fit réponse éditoriale d’une grande finesse qui arriva à point nommé. 
MOTS-CLÉS – Exhaustivité, Inférence fiduciaire, Maximum de vraisemblance, Paramètre 
SUMMARY – In hommage to Bernard Bru, the story is told of the crucial influence Karl Pearson 
had on Ronald Fisher through a timely and perceptive editorial reply to a hasty and insufficiently 
considered short submission by Fisher. 
KEY-WORDS – Fiducial inference, Maximum likelihood, Parameter, Sufficiency, 
It is a great personal pleasure to join in this celebration of the friendship and 
scholarship of Bernard Bru. Over a period of more than 20 years I have enjoyed 
adventures with Bernard, adventures that have taken us to surprising and exotic corners 
of the literature of the statistical world. We have chased ghosts in that literature – 
references to works that cannot be proven to exist, nor can they be proven not to exist. 
We have sought skeletons, as in the literature of craniometry. We have pursued foods 
and recipes, as in the case of the dessert invented by Laplace and made famous by 
Brillat-Savarin. He has helped me identify rare works of art – such as a contemporary 
drawing of Laplace and Napoleon. He has identified for me inscriptions on the Pantheon 
that are barely a trace, and obscure citations that would have stymied Inspectors Poirot 
and Maigret. In his Essai philosophique sur les probabilités, Laplace famously 
described a deterministic world where to an infinite intelligence nothing would be 
beyond the view, a description that reasonably well captures Bernard’s vast knowledge 
of the great historic literature of probability and statistics. 
On this occasion I wish to discuss an unusual event in the early history of 
twentieth century statistics, and to share with you what was for me a surprising 
discovery. It involves Ronald Fisher and Karl Pearson, and it may help explain a key 
point in the development of modern statistics. And it has a tangential but significant link 
to research of Bernard’s that goes forward at present. 
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Fisher has always been a puzzle to modern statisticians. The vast influence of his 
work on experimental design is undeniable. The impact of his methods and theory, from 
his analysis of variance to his distributions of correlation coefficients and regression 
estimates, is found everywhere in our texts and courses. But other aspects of Fisher’s 
work and thought are more elusive. What is fiducial inference? What exactly is an 
ancillary statistic? What is a recognizable subset? Under what conditions are maximum 
likelihood estimates truly optimal? In the first half of the twentieth century, the great 
Maurice Frechet was among those who recognized the fertility of Fisher’s work but also 
found some parts of it mysterious. While most people were content to scratch their 
heads and make quiet comments about their doubts that Fisher had a clear idea in mind 
on all of these, Frechet took action. In the 1930s, Frechet had generated a considerable 
correspondence toward the goal of better understanding a Karl Pearsonian structure, the 
correlation coefficient. Much of this was published at the time in the journals of the 
International Statistical Institute. With the fruit born of that dialogue, it is 
understandable that in the 1940s Frechet undertook a different and altogether more 
challenging attempt to better understand fiducial inference. And as Bernard Bru’s deep 
and ongoing work on French work of this period went forward, it is natural that he 
would uncover the results of Frechet’s efforts in the Frechet archive in the Académie 
des Sciences. 
Some of this correspondence has since been published with a volume of Fisher’s 
correspondence [Bennett, 1990], but the correspondents ranged much further than just 
Fisher, as Frechet sought to draw out a wide spectrum of people on an elusive idea, 
although in the end he failed to make significant headway. The question Frechet asked 
is not one I will address here, except indirectly perhaps. But Bernard shared this archive 
with me at a time when I was beginning to look seriously at Fisher’s work as a puzzled 
historian instead of as a puzzled practicing statistician, and that archive helped condition 
me to what I think is a new understanding of an earlier event that was crucial to Fisher’s 
development as a statistician. It is that event that I will discuss here, the question of how 
Fisher became a statistician in the first place. I tell the story in more detail elsewhere 
[Stigler, 2005]; my account here will concentrate upon the narrative, and, yes, the drama 
of the event. 
It was by no means foreordained that Fisher would work in statistics at all.  He 
had a brilliant career as a mathematics student at Cambridge University and published 
two student papers at that time, one a short piece on statistical error theory, the other a 
longer exposition on vector analysis through differential geometry. Neither advanced 
their subjects in important ways, but the second showed a firm grasp of an astonishing 
range of modern mathematics. After he left Cambridge in 1913, he largely dropped out 
of mathematics, as he became an indifferent teacher in a series of secondary schools and 
devoted his intellectual energy almost exclusively to eugenics, both social and scientific 
issues related to issues of heredity, with particular attention to how the latter could 
inform the former. Through the years 1914 to 1920 he published 95 separate pieces. Of 
these, 92 were on eugenics (mostly book reviews), one was related to eugenics concerns 
(his major 1918 work on statistical genetics), and only two could be said to be centrally 
concerned with mathematical statistics. One of these was his masterful derivation of the 
distribution of the correlation coefficient in 1915; the other a work that appeared in 
1920 and is related to what I will discuss here. This was not on the face of it the record 
of a major statistician, nor for that matter a dedicated geneticist. And yet in 1921 Fisher 
presented a major pathbreaking memoir to the Royal Society of London, a memoir that 
more than any other single work gave the framework and direction to twentieth century 
statistical theory. 
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Fisher’s memoir [Fisher, 1922] introduced ideas as basic as the parametric family 
of distributions (the word “parameter” appears 57 times in the memoir, its first 
appearance in the modern statistical sense). The terms and concepts of likelihood, 
sufficiency, consistency, efficiency are new here, too. The memoir focused upon the 
theory of estimation, but a few years later Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson adopted 
Fisher’s framework for their theory of hypothesis testing, and the resurgence of 
Bayesian statistics later in that century also adopted Fisher’s framework, even if not his 
use of it. The memoir was in this way a watershed for twentieth century statistics. It had 
nothing to do with eugenics, Fisher’s principal preoccupation at that time. Where did it 
come from? 
Recall that through this decade Fisher, trained as a mathematician, was most 
deeply concerned with eugenics. A good share of this interest was social policy-
oriented, but the scientific issues caught his attention as well. And at that time anyone 
with a mathematical interest in eugenics would have naturally been drawn to the pages 
of the journal Biometrika, founded in 1901 by Karl Pearson. Indeed, one of Fisher’s 
notes in a eugenics journal in 1915 was simply to point out to the eugenics community 
the importance of Biometrika to eugenics. Once his eyes were on Biometrika, they 
inevitably strayed to some more basic articles. As early as 1912 he had noted “Student” 
writing in Biometrika on the t-test, and Fisher had sent him a cryptic letter suggesting 
how the t-distribution could be rigorously derived. And in 1914 Fisher similarly was 
moved, this time by an article by H. E. Soper trying to approximate the distribution of 
the correlation coefficient. This time his interest resulted in a publication, his first 
important contribution to statistics [Fisher, 1915]. Still, as impressive as his derivation 
of the distribution of the sample correlation coefficient was, with its mastery of high 
dimensional spaces that had been foreshadowed by the 1913 college paper on vector 
analysis, it still did not hint at the author of Fisher [1922]. The article showed Fisher’s 
energy and mathematical facility, and that he could solve technical problems beyond 
any other statisticians of that time, but there was no sign of the theory, the statistical 
conceptualization that was to come. 
The crucial event I describe came in 1916. Fisher was continuing to think a bit 
about the correlation coefficient, and his relations with Karl Pearson remained cordial.  
Fisher had also started work on his first major effort on statistical genetics. This work, 
on the correlation of relatives under Mendelian inheritance, was eventually published in 
1918, and may be seen as broadly within his eugenics program. The techniques he used 
carried the seeds of later work in the analysis of variance (and much other work in 
genetics) but it too lacked a framework within statistical theory. In May of 1916, that 
year’s only issue of Biometrika appeared, and within a month Fisher wrote a short note 
to Pearson, with two enclosures. One of these was a draft of the work on Mendelian 
inheritance, a dense and hard to read memoir, even today. Fisher knew Pearson was 
interested in this topic, even if he probably did not expect Pearson to take to his findings 
immediately. He would have known that Pearson and the Mendelian biologist Bateson 
had quarreled earlier on the value of biometry, and Pearson was on record as doubting 
that Mendelian inheritance could easily explain inheritance in human populations 
[Porter, 2004]. Fisher’s work would reconcile the positions, once it was understood and 
accepted. The other enclosure was in comparison a trivial effort. It was only one page in 
length, but unlike the long genetics article, it was sent as a submission for publication in 
Biometrika. Fisher wrote, 
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There is an article by Miss Kirstine Smith in the current number of 
Biometrika which, I think, ought not to pass without comment.  I enclose a 
short note on it. 
Fisher’s letter, his one page submission, and Pearson’s reply are all reprinted in 
full in a 1968 article by E. S. Pearson, and various portions of them have been cited and 
quoted by several subsequent authors. Yet I think the full significance of this exchange 
has been missed. On the face of it, the issue was a simple one.  The paper referred to 
[Smith, 1916] was by a young Dane working as a doctoral student in Pearson’s 
laboratory. She presented through examples a short case for the use of minimum chi-
square as a criterion for estimation, in preference to what she called the Gaussian 
method. The Gaussian method was the then-classical staple of error theory; it was 
essentially maximum likelihood, based upon a vague Bayesian argument where a 
uniform prior was assumed for the object of estimation. Smith thought the use of a 
distance measure (the chi-squared metric) was preferable, even though it required 
grouped data. Some of her examples used discrete data, some involved grouped 
continuous data. Fisher’s one-page hand-written submission complained that with 
continuous data, different ways of grouping the data would produce different results, a 
logical inconsistency that should be avoided. As Fisher wrote : 
There is nothing at all ‘arbitrary’ in the use of the method of moments for the 
normal curve; as I have shown elsewhere it flows directly from the absolute 
criterion (Σlogf a maximum) derived from the Principle of Inverse 
Probability. There is, on the other hand, something exceedingly arbitrary in a 
criterion which depends entirely upon the manner in which the data happen 
to be grouped. 
Fisher’s reference to having “shown elsewhere” was to his undergraduate paper, 
Fisher [1912], where he had used the Gaussian method in choosing a normal 
distribution from data, where it led to method-of-moments values [Aldrich, 1997; 
Edwards, 1997; Hald, 1998]. Pearson also had used the Gaussian method in 1898 to 
derive the estimate of the correlation coefficient, and Fisher was apparently defending a 
Pearsonian position in his submission. The response he got must have been an 
unwelcome surprise. 
Pearson’s reply was a full two pages – longer than the submission it declined.  
The temptation is to read it as a dismissal of a paper of merit that criticized work from 
Pearson’s own laboratory. Pearson did do that, but not on the simple basis that is tacit in 
that description. This was not the letter of a closed-minded older man unwilling to abide 
with even indirect criticism. It was rather the letter of a first-rate editor to a novice 
author who had sent a paper in without seriously considering the issues involved.  
Pearson told Fisher exactly what was wrong with his note, and exactly what was needed 
to correct it. 
Fisher had adopted the Gaussian method without serious examination of the 
principles behind it. He seems to have been attracted to it only as a handy tool that gave 
results that seemed to be free of mathematical inconsistencies such as he noted in 
Smith’s paper. He seemed to have never considered the case that needed to be presented 
for his own position. 
Pearson noted in his letter that he himself had used the Gaussian method before 
[Pearson, Filon, 1898], but he now doubted it on logical grounds. For the main 
philosophical objection to the Gaussian method, he referred to a footnote in Smith’s 
paper where she noted the probability being maximized by the Gaussian method was 
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hardly a probability at all; and even if it be multiplied by a differential element to make 
it a probability of a neighborhood of the observed data, that probability was infinitely 
small. What use was a criterion that gave a result with an infinitely small probability? 
Much better to use a distance measure like chi-square. Pearson closed with an 
invitation. 
If you will write me a defence of the Gaussian method, I will certainly 
consider its publication, but if I were to publish your note, it would have to 
be followed by another note saying that it missed the point, and that would be 
a quarrel among contributors. 
There is no reply from Fisher in the archives. But what could he have said?  The 
truth is that there was at that time no principled reply. Fisher, like a host of others before 
him, had accepted a vague inverse-probability appeal as sufficient to justify the 
maximization of a probability or density that even at its maximum is very small. By the 
cold light of Pearson’s straightforward letter, there really was no case. Fisher put the 
letter aside (it was among a small amount of early correspondence he preserved to the 
end of his life), grumbled silently about Pearson, and returned to other business. 
But he must have continued to think about the issue Pearson raised. In 1919, 
shortly before he moved from teaching to a research post at Rothamsted’s agricultural 
research station, he was led by chance to an astounding discovery. The astrophysicist  
A. S. Eddington had claimed in a 1914 book that it was better to estimate the standard 
deviation of a normal distribution using a multiple of the mean absolute deviation from 
the mean, than using a multiple of the root mean squared deviation from the mean, 
adding, 
This is contrary to the advice of most text-books; but it can be shown to be 
true [Eddington, 1914, p. 147]. 
Fisher’s skills with multiple algebra made short work of Eddington’s erroneous 
claim: in small and in large samples, the usual estimate had a smaller standard 
deviation. He wrote to Eddington, and Eddington replied in July 1919, agreeing that his 
statement had been wrong. But Fisher did not stop there; he took one more step, and that 
step was to prove decisive. For the case n = 4, Fisher looked to see if perhaps even 
though the usual estimate was superior, some improvement might be had by 
incorporating the other estimate in some way, say using an average of the two. He 
derived the conditional distribution of Eddington’s estimate given the usual one and was 
astounded to find it did not involve the object of estimation at all! Once he had the usual 
estimate in hand there was absolutely no prospect of gain from the other estimate! When 
Fisher published this little investigation in 1920, his italicized statement fairly shouted 
this result: 
The whole of the information respecting [the standard deviation], which a 
sample provides, is summed up in the value of [the usual estimate]. 
This was his first discovery of sufficiency [Fisher, 1920; Stigler, 1973]. 
Here at last he had a germ of a reply to Pearson. The next step he took is not 
recorded, but it must have been to ask how general this phenomenon was. I speculate 
that what he did next is precisely the first mathematical derivation he presented in the 
1922 memoir. There he assumed that he had two estimates, one a sufficient statistic, and 
the two of them having approximately a bivariate normal distribution. Working with 
that bivariate density he then showed that the insufficient estimate must have a larger 
standard deviation than the sufficient estimate. At that time he was convinced (wrongly, 
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as it turned out) that the Gaussian method, which he now called the method of 
maximum likelihood, always produced a sufficient estimate. If that was so, he had a 
devastating reply to Pearson.  Maximizing the likelihood function might not produce a 
very high value for that probability or density, but for large samples it would 
automatically lead to the estimate with the smallest standard deviation. 
He submitted his memoir to the Royal Society in June 1921. So much intricate 
work was involved that he would have had little time for anything else, although he did 
also review 17 books on eugenics that year. The memoir examined in detail the relative 
worth of Pearson’s method of moments and the newly named method of maximum 
likelihood, showing that within the Pearson family of densities, the method of moments 
only performed decently for curves near the normal density, where it was in fact 
maximum likelihood. There was much more in the memoir, including a look at the 
method of minimum chi-square (it was equivalent to maximum likelihood for large 
samples, but suffered a second order loss of information for finite samples). 
Pearson’s 1916 challenge had born remarkable fruit – the modern theory of 
estimation and the associated conceptual structure were effectively born in that single 
memoir. Fisher however never acknowledged Pearson as an important influence on him, 
and Pearson never saw that Fisher’s theory was an effective answer to the challenge of 
1916. And one of the first bonuses from Fisher’s parametric framework led to Fisher’s 
correction of Pearson’s error on the number of degrees of freedom for the chi-square 
test, a discovery that did not help the relationship between the two [Stigler, 1999(a), 
Chapter 19]. Indeed, the impact of Fisher’s memoir was only slowly felt. Fisher himself 
rewrote and expanded portions of it [Hinkley, 1980], and the framework was further 
spread through its adoption by Neyman and Egon Pearson in 1928. He achieved early 
recognition in America by Harold Hotelling [Stigler, 1999(b)]. The proofs Fisher gave 
were incomplete and vague in detail, and debate on central points extended for decades. 
But the statistical landscape was forever changed. 
The point I emphasize here is that it was only when Pearson challenged him in the 
highest tradition of scientific editing in 1916 that Fisher paused to consider the case to 
be made for his methods, and saw that it was deficient. His biggest influence at this 
stage was Pearson; not eugenics, not the research environment at Rothamsted, not his 
teaching or university training, but Karl Pearson. Without Pearson’s question, it seems 
extremely unlikely Fisher would have seen how his surprising discovery of sufficiency 
was the key to a whole theory of estimation, and a broad framework for addressing 
statistical questions more broadly. 
Does this event have any bearing on the question Frechet asked in the 1940s about 
the meaning of fiducial inference? Perhaps, even if only through its indication of the 
way Fisher’s mind worked, in making extraordinarily fruitful leaps that could not 
always be sustained under rigorous mathematical examination. Fisher’s early 
enthusiastic assumption that maximum likelihood estimates were always sufficient was 
put aside later, leaving holes that were never fully addressed. His claims about ancillary 
statistics sometimes exceeded what he or anyone else could show [Stigler, 2001]. The 
history of our subject is filled with fascinating mysteries. Bernard Bru understands this 
better than anyone, and his work has deeply enriched us. I regard these remarks as 
influenced by the curiosity aroused through his sharing of the Frechet archival 
discovery, and I am, unlike Fisher, pleased to acknowledge his assistance.  I eagerly 
await his completion of his great work-in-progress on twentieth century French 
probability and statistics. 
 HOW RONALD FISHER BECAME A MATHEMATICAL STATISTICIAN 29 
REFERENCES 
ALDRICH J., “R. A. Fisher and the making of maximum likelihood 1912-1922”, 
Statistical Science 12, 1997, p. 162-176. 
BENNETT J. H. (ed),  Statistical inference and analysis:  selected correspondence of  
R. A. Fisher, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990. 
BOX, J. F., R. A. Fisher: the life of a scientist, New York, Wiley, 1978. 
EDDINGTON A. S., Stellar movements and the structure of the universe, London, 
Macmillan, 1914. 
EDWARDS, A.W.F., “What did Fisher mean by ‘inverse probability’ in 1912-1922?”, 
Statistical Science 12, 1997, p. 177-184. 
FIENBERG S.E., HINKLEY D.V., (eds), “R. A. Fisher: an appreciation”, published as 
Lecture Notes in Statistics, Volume 1, New York, Springer-Verlag, 1980. 
FISHER R.A., “On an absolute criterion for fitting frequency curves”, Messenger of 
Mathematics 41, 1912, p. 155-160; [reprinted as Paper 1 in Fisher, 1974; reprinted in 
Edwards, 1997]. 
FISHER R.A., “Applications of vector analysis to geometry”, Messenger of 
Mathematics 42, 1913, p. 161-178; [reprinted as Paper 2 in Fisher, 1974]. 
FISHER R.A., “Frequency distribution of the values of the correlation coefficient in 
samples from an indefinitely large population”, Biometrika 10, 1915, p. 507-521; 
[reprinted as Paper 4 in Fisher, 1974]. 
FISHER R.A., “The correlation between relatives on the supposition of Mendelian 
inheritance”, Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh 52, 1918, p. 399-433; 
[reprinted as Paper 9 in Fisher, 1974. Also reprinted with commentary in Moran and 
Smith,1966]. 
FISHER R.A., “A mathematical examination of the methods of determining the 
accuracy of an observation by the mean error, and by the mean square error”, Monthly 
Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 80, 1920, p. 758-770; [reprinted as Paper 12 
in Fisher, 1974]. 
FISHER R.A., “On the mathematical foundations of theoretical statistics” Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London (A) 222, 1922, p. 309-368. [Reprinted as 
Paper 18 in Fisher, 1974]. 
FISHER R.A., The collected papers of R. A. Fisher (ed. J. H. Bennett), Adelaide, 
University of Adelaide Press, 1974. 
GEISSER S., “Introduction to Fisher (1922). On the mathematical foundations of 
theoretical statistics”, Breakthroughs in Statistics, Vol. I, (S. Kotz and N. L. Johnson, 
eds), New York, Springer-Verlag, 1992. 
HALD A., A history of mathematical statistics from 1750 to 1930, New York, Wiley, 
1998. 
HINKLEY D.V., Theory of statistical estimation: The 1925 paper, 1980, p. 85-94. 
KENDALL M.G., PLACKETT R.L., Studies in the history of statistics and probability,   
Vol. 2, London, Griffin, 1977. 
MORAN P.A.P., SMITH C.A.B., Commentary on R. A. Fisher’s paper on ‘The 
correlation between relatives on the supposition of Mendelian inheritance’, Eugenics 
Laboratory Memoirs XLI, published for the Galton Laboratory, University College 
London, by Cambridge University Press, 1966. 
NEYMAN J., PEARSON E.S., “On the use and interpretation of certain test criteria for 
purposes of statistical inference” Part I, Biometrika 20A, 1928, p. 175-240. 
 S.M. STIGLER 30 
PEARSON E.S., “Some early correspondence between W. S. Gosset, R. A. Fisher and 
Karl Pearson, with notes and comments”, Biometrika 55, 1968, p. 445-457. 
PEARSON K., FILON L.N.G., “Mathematical contributions to the theory of evolution 
IV. On the probable errors of frequency constants and on the influence of random 
selection on variation and correlation”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
of London, Series A, 191, 1898, p. 229-251. 
PORTER Th.M., Karl Pearson: The Scientific Life in a Statistical Age, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2004. 
SMITH K., “On the ‘best’ values of the constants in frequency distributions”, 
Biometrika 11, 1916, p. 262-276. 
STIGLER S.M., “Laplace, Fisher, and the discovery of the concept of sufficiency”, 
Biometrika 60, 1973, p. 439-445, [reprinted in Kendall and Plackett, 1977, p. 271-277]. 
STIGLER S.M., Contribution to discussion of “On rereading R. A. Fisher,” by             
L. J. Savage, Annals of Statistics 4, 1976, p. 498-500. 
STIGLER S.M., The history of statistics: the measurement of uncertainty before 1900, 
Cambridge (Mass), Harvard University Press, 1986. 
STIGLER S.M., Statistics on the table, Cambridge (Mass), Harvard University Press, 
1999(a). 
STIGLER S.M., “The foundations of statistics at Stanford” American Statistician 53, 
1999(b), p. 263-266. 
STIGLER S.M., “Ancillary history”, M.C.M. de Gunst, C.A.J. Klaassen, A.W. van der 
Vaart (eds), State of the art in probability and statistics; festschrift for Willem R. van 
Zwet, Institute of Mathematical Statistics, Lecture Notes-Monograph Series 36, 2001,  
p. 555-567. 
STIGLER S.M., “Fisher in 1921”, Statistical Science 20, 2005, p. 32-49. 
ZABELL S.L., “R. A. Fisher and the fiducial argument”, Statistical Science 7, 1992,    
p. 369-387. 
